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1 
A State Law Approach to Preserving 
Fair Use in Academic Libraries  
David R. Hansen* 
 
Every year academic libraries spend millions of dollars to 
provide their users access to copyrighted works. Much of that 
money goes not toward purchasing physical copies of books or 
journals, but toward licensing electronic content from publishers. 
In those electronic license agreements, the default rules for how 
users interact with copyrighted content is often altered, and 
academic library users are deprived of basic rights—especially 
rights such as fair use—which are granted under federal copyright 
law. The literature is flush with discussion of the misuse of private 
contracts to alter the rights granted by Congress in copyright’s 
statutory scheme. As a result, there have been many proposals to 
maintain copyright’s balance between content owners’ and users’ 
rights through either the adoption of model licenses or changes to 
federal law. 
Because those proposals have thus far failed to slow private 
contracts’ fervent erosion of users’ rights, this paper proposes a 
modest state-law solution to the problem for one class of users that 
is especially hurt by this change: academic library users. This 
paper envisions a state law that would render void any contract 
provision between a rights holder and a state institution that 
modifies or eliminates fair use for users. This approach is 
especially valuable in preserving fair use for public academic 
library users—a class of users for whom fair use is particularly 
important given their interest in free speech, academic freedom, 
and the creation of new, innovative uses for creative works. Given 
 
* Thanks to Lolly Gasaway, Barbara Moran, Kevin Smith and, of course, Janice Hansen, 
for their many helpful comments.  
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the growth in general of licensing (an area largely governed by 
state law) this proposal is also a useful starting place for 
discussion about the use of state law to preserve users’ rights in 
copyrighted works. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For years now, academic libraries have spent their money 
licensing copyrighted content.  In the past, a book was a book, and 
libraries were free to lend, manipulate, or even destroy the copies 
of the works that they had purchased.  The doctrine of first-sale 
permitted such activities.
1
  Likewise, library users were able to 
copy, redistribute, and transform content so long as those uses fell 
within the amorphous bounds of ―fair use.‖2  But for the last 
 
 1 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). See generally Aaron Parzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital 
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011) (discussing the doctrine of first sale and the 
broader principle of ―exhaustion,‖ and explaining how the doctrine is perceived of as of 
as having limited usefulness as applied to digital distribution).  
 2 Id. § 107.  
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several years, the percentage of academic library expenditures on 
licensed electronic content has dwarfed that of traditional print 
acquisitions.  In 2008–2009, fifty-seven percent of Association of 
Research Library (―ARL‖) member materials expenditures were 
devoted to licensed electronic content.
3
  In total, ARL libraries 
spent over $700 million on electronic resources in that same time 
period, compared to only about $77 million ten years earlier in 
1998–1999 (constituting about ten percent of total materials 
expenditures for that year).
4
  Nearly all of this new electronic 
content is licensed to libraries under either perpetual or recurring 
terms.
5
  Those licenses are contracts that change the default rules 
for how libraries and their users interact with copyrighted content.
6
  
The new norm among libraries is licensing access, not purchasing 
copies; this change can mean a significant reduction in library 
users‘ rights.7 
Because of this shift, much has been written on how libraries 
(and users in general) deal with licenses.  The literature focuses on 
two of the most noxious aspects of licenses.  The first is the reality 
that licenses are legal documents drafted by lawyers, which can 
 
 3 ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., ARL STATISTICS 2008–2009 20–21 (2010), available at 
http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/arlstat09.pdf [hereinafter ARL STATISTICS].  Association of 
Research Libraries (―ARL‖) membership is made up of ―126 research libraries at 
comprehensive, research-extensive institutions in the U.S. and Canada.‖ About ARL, 
ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/arl/index.shtml (last visited July 31, 2011).  
 4 ARL STATISTICS, supra note 3.  
 5 See Duncan E. Alford, Negotiating and Analyzing Electronic License Agreements, 
94 L. LIBR. J. 621, 640 (noting that while some are of the view that publishers should 
provide perpetual access to material, license agreements are more valuable to publishers 
when they require recurring payments); see also Kristin H. Gerhard, Pricing Models for 
Electronic Journals and Other Electronic Academic Materials: The State of the Art, 42 J. 
LIBR. ADMIN. 1, 13 (2005). 
 6 As a general point, use and access issues associated with electronic content may 
extend well beyond the actual terms of the license itself. See Ann Bartow, Some Peer-to-
Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced Thoughts, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 451, 464–65 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: 
HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)) (―Most 
electronic publications are licensed, rather than sold, under terms and conditions that may 
not be readily negotiable.  It is not at all clear that digitization enhances access, and it 
may instead be true that it decreases the scope of collections over time, because when a 
subscription runs out, even the back issues of a periodical may be rendered 
unavailable.‖). 
 7 See id.   
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make them difficult to read, interpret, and negotiate without 
previous legal experience.
8
  In contract-law terms, these are 
onerous procedural elements of contract formation through which 
librarians must navigate to achieve access for their users.
9
  The 
second aspect that is regularly explored is how licenses change the 
default rules of copyright which dictate how users may interact 
with creative content.
10
  These substantive modifications—
especially when considered across the amalgam of licenses that 
academic libraries enter into—create a patchwork of users‘ rights 
that is more restrictive than what copyright law naturally provides, 
and that stifles normal academic exploitation of the subject 
copyrighted works.
11
 
This paper focuses on the substantive changes that licenses 
make—alteration of default legal rules, with particular regard to 
the fair use right—and explains how proposed solutions to 
preserve the balance of rights between rights holders and users 
have not been particularly effective.  So far, proposals to remedy 
the situation have been either too ambitious or too conservative in 
scope.  Proposals to rectify the situation at the federal level—either 
through Congress or the courts—are appealing, but fail to 
realistically gauge the likelihood of these politically-fraught 
modifications to copyright law in the current political climate.  
Likewise, the growing panoply of voluntary model licenses and 
best practices fails to recognize the necessity of uniformity and 
enforceability in both the law and practice. 
After explaining the importance of maintaining copyrights‘ 
balance of rights for academic library users (focusing heavily on 
 
 8 Licensing Digital Information: Introduction, YALE UNIV. LIBR. LIBLICENSE, (2006), 
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/index.shtml [LIBLICENSE, Introduction].  
 9 Scrutinizing the conscionability of a contract is sometimes done by splitting the 
analysis into two, looking first at the procedure of contract formation (procedural 
unconscionability) and then at the actual substance of the contract terms (substantive 
unconscionability).  This approach was pioneered by Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and 
the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967), and has been 
adopted by many courts.  This paper does not suggest that licensing terms that impinge 
on educational fair use rights are necessarily unconscionable, but uses the procedural-
substantive framework to facilitate the discussion in familiar terms. 
 10 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.   
 11 Id.  
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fair use), this paper explores three currently proposed potential 
solutions: federal intervention, voluntary model licenses, and 
wholesale modification of state contract law.  Because those 
reforms have thus far proved ineffective, this paper suggests a 
more limited solution that uses state law as way to maintain 
balance, at least in the context of academic library licensing.  
Namely, this paper proposes a state-law restriction on public 
institutions that would render void any contract terms entered into 
between rights holders and state institutions that eliminate or 
modify the scope of fair use.  After outlining the strengths and 
weaknesses of such a change, the paper concludes by suggesting 
other areas of concern that may be addressed with similar state-law 
changes. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH LICENSES 
Licenses serve an important role in academic libraries.  They 
establish the ground rules by which vendors and libraries interact.
12
 
They memorialize hard-negotiated prices, subscription packages, 
and other details of what, exactly, libraries will pay and what they 
will get in exchange for their payments.
13
  While some of these 
terms are common to any contract—and may even remain 
unstated, left to be filled in by the default rules of commercial 
contract law
14—licenses also address important goals that are 
 
 12 See generally Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR. 
(July 15, 1997), http://www.arl.org/sc/marketplace/license/licprinciples.shtml. 
 13 See, e.g., Ebsco Publishing License Agreement, EBSCO HOST, http://support.ebsco 
host.com/ehost/terms.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).  See generally Kristen M. 
Cichocki, Unlocking the Future of Public Libraries: Digital Licensing that Preserves 
Access, 16 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 40 (2007).   
 14 The rules of contract law have long been conceived of as the default rules which 
apply to fill in gaps left either intentionally or unintentionally in contracts.  The classic 
article explaining this view is Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner‘s Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).  Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one such set of contract rules that has been 
created to provide a uniform set of gap-filling provisions for contracts dealing with the 
sale of goods. UCC art. 2.  An alternative set of UCC provisions—originally dubbed UCC 
Article 2B—is the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which 
was created in an attempt to provide alternative default rules to address the difficulties of 
electronic commerce, specifically addressing things such as software licensing and online 
transactions.  See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text (discussing UCITA and 
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peculiar to academic libraries, such as setting terms for 
preservation, access, privacy, and maintenance of digital content 
contained in databases.
15
  Licenses and licensing negotiations 
provide great benefit to academic libraries that wish to carefully 
tailor subscriptions to their institutional needs.
16
  At the same time, 
even carefully drafted licenses can be costly to negotiate and may 
still leave libraries (and their users) without the rights on which 
they rely for normal academic uses of the underlying works.
17
 
A. Problems 
Given the sheer scale of electronic subscriptions and purchases, 
librarians must spend a great deal of time reading and evaluating 
the terms of their electronic licenses.
18
  The literature is replete 
with guides to understanding and managing licenses in academic 
libraries.
19
  Perhaps because of the breadth of issues that license 
contracts must consider, they can easily become complicated legal 
documents.
20
  Typically drafted by a lawyer, the terms of these 
contracts are often long, confusing, and ambiguous.
21
  From the 
library‘s perspective, negotiating these contracts can be difficult, 
especially because many of the terms are presented as non-
negotiable.
22
  Although large academic libraries are sophisticated 
enough to know that some negotiation may be possible, take-it-or-
 
related attempts to address some of the ―procedural‖ issues with contract formation).  
Modifying default contract rules to address the imbalance of rights that has arisen 
because of the licensing of digitally distributed content may be an appealing alternative to 
the more limited approach advocated in this paper, and is an area worthy of further study.  
 15 See Cichocki, supra note 13, at 40; Libraries and Licensing, AM. LIBR. ASS‘N, 
http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/copyright/librariesandlicensing/LibrariesAnd 
Licensing.cfm (last updated Aug. 25, 2006). 
 16 See Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, supra note 12 (noting that 
negotiation is important in arriving at ―mutually acceptable‖ terms in a license).    
 17 See generally id.  
 18 See generally LIBLICENSE, Introduction, supra note 8. 
 19 See, e.g., KARAN RUPP-SERRANO, LICENSING IN LIBRARIES: PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL 
ASPECTS (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the practical and legal issues that arise with using 
licensed content on campus); LESLEY ELLEN HARRIS, LICENSING DIGITAL CONTENT: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LIBRARIANS (2d ed. 2009).  
 20 See LIBLICENSE, Introduction, supra note 8.  
 21 Id.  
 22 See Anna May Wyatt, Licenses, the Law, and Libraries, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 163, 163 
(2005). 
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leave-it ―adhesion contracts‖ like these force libraries to spend 
resources haggling over terms that may or may not be alterable.
23
 
Procedural costs of contract formation can also rise quickly 
because, while vendors present these contracts as standard-form, 
the contracts actually vary significantly from vendor to vendor.
24
  
Even terms that appear uniform may not have a uniform meaning 
from contract to contract, and understanding and negotiating these 
terms can be time consuming.
25
  For example, one recent question 
regarding a license limitation, providing that users of licensed 
works can only engage in ―non-commercial use,‖26 sparked a 
listserv debate over the meaning of the term among librarians from 
across the country.
27
  Does the ―non-commercial use‖ clause mean 
that just ―profit-producing‖ uses are prohibited, or is cost-recovery 
allowed?  Basic contract terms like these can become even more 
complicated with the incorporation and misuse of technical legal 
terms.
28
 
Of course, the formation of almost any contract is subject to the 
same criticism.  But for academic libraries, which license literally 
millions of works from thousands of vendors, the problem is 
exacerbated; they must spend enormous amounts of time 
evaluating, discussing, and negotiating many individual licenses 
 
 23 See Gerhard, supra note 5, at 15.   
 24 See Stephen Bosch, Using Model Licenses, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 66, 67 (2005). 
 25 See id. at 66. 
 26 E.g., Ebsco Publishing License Agreement, supra note 13 (stating simply that 
―[r]emote access to the Databases or Services is permitted to patrons of subscribing 
institutions accessing from remote locations for personal, non-commercial use.‖).  Other 
license terms are more specific. E.g., Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR, 
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) 
(stating  ―Institutional Licensees and users may not . . . use or authorize the use of the 
JSTOR Platform or Content for commercial purposes or gains, including charging a fee-
for-service for the use of JSTOR beyond reasonable printing or administrative costs. For 
purposes of clarification, ‗commercial purposes or gains‘ shall not include research 
whose end-use is commercial in nature.‖). 
 27 See Posting of Charles Hamaker, cahamake@uncc.edu, to liblicense-
1@lists.yale.edu (Feb. 28, 2011, 21:57 EST), available at http://www.library.yale.edu/~ 
llicense/ListArchives/1103/msg00001.html. 
 28 See Bosch, supra note 24, at 73. 
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separately.
29
  Given the difficulties in the procedure of contract 
formation (nevermind the substantive terms of the agreements), it 
is unsurprising that librarians have taken these issues seriously,
30
 
resulting in the creation of a whole host of model licenses and best 
practices,
31
 and instigating calls for more thorough legal education 
of librarians at ALA-library schools.
32
 
In terms of contract substance, licenses can be problematic for 
academic libraries because licenses restrict the way that libraries 
and their users interact with copyrighted content.
33
  Federal 
copyright law grants authors (or their assignees—typically 
publishers) certain exclusive rights over the works they create.
34
  
Exceptions to those exclusive rights exist for the benefit of users 
and the public at large.
35
  Congress crafted federal copyright law, it 
has been said, to strike a delicate balance between the rights of 
copyright owners and those of the user-public.
36
 
In striking that balance, authors are given the exclusive right to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the 
 
 29 The problem of varying license terms has been extensively considered and 
addressed through the proposal of a variety of standard license terms. For a more 
thorough discussion, see infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text.  
 30 The sheer volume of library-licensing literature is a testament to how seriously 
librarians have taken this issue.  LibLicense, a website devoted to library licensing issues, 
maintains this thorough a bibliography of library licensing resources. Licensing of Digital 
Information: Bibliography of Licensing Sources, YALE UNIV. LIBR. LIBLICENSE, 
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/bibliogr.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (listing 
well over 100 sources that discuss licensing issues for libraries in depth).  
 31 See infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed model 
licenses as solutions to library licensing problems).  
 32 See William M. Cross & Phillip M. Edwards, Preservice Legal Education for 
Academic Librarians Within ALA-Accredited Degree Programs, 11 PORTAL: LIBR. & 
ACAD. 533, 541 (2011). 
 33 See David C. Fowler, Licensing: An Historical Perspective, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 177, 
179–83 (2005). 
 34 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing six exclusive rights); 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) 
(copyright ownership vests initially in the author of the work).   
 35 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–20 (2006) (listing exceptions to the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners). 
 36 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (―[A]lthough dissemination of 
creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the 
artist‘s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the 
public‘s need for access to creative works.‖). 
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public, and perform the copyrighted work publicly.
37
  Balancing 
against authors‘ broad rights are a number of exceptions and 
limitations intended to benefit users.  Included among these are 
specific statutory exceptions for face-to-face and distance 
education,
38
 library preservation,
39
 as well as  the ―first sale‖ 
limitation,
40
 which is particularly useful in the library context 
because it allows purchasers, but not licensees, of copies of 
copyrighted works to freely transfer (sell, lend, inter-library loan) 
their legally acquired copies.  The broadest and most difficult to 
apply exception, however, is likely that of fair use,
41
 an ―equitable 
rule of reason‖ that permits users to make unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works under certain circumstances.
42
  The discussion 
below focuses on how licenses change the scope of fair use with 
respect to uses of materials in academic libraries; however, many 
of the same observations can also be made with respect to the other 
exceptions mentioned above. 
Fair use is the most general and most ambiguous exception to 
the exclusive rights of copyright owners.  It permits the 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works whenever its four-factor, 
―context-specific‖ balancing test weighs in the user‘s favor.43  Fair 
uses include such statutorily-favored areas of use such as 
―criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or 
 
 37 Id. § 106(1)–(4).  That statute also grants special exclusive rights with respect to the 
public display of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works and for the public performance of sound recordings 
by means of a digital audio transmission. Id. § 106(5)–(6).  
 38 Id. § 110(1)–(2). 
 39 See, e.g., id. § 108.  
 40 See id. § 109(a) (first sale doctrine); see generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 
U.S. 339 (1908) (identifying the first sale limitation).  First sale is another doctrine whose 
importance for libraries has eroded with the rise of digital distribution and licensing. See 
generally Parzanowski & Schultz, supra note 1. 
 41 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 (―The judicial doctrine of fair use [is] one of the most 
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners.‖). 
 42 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 20 (―[S]ince the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule 
of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the 
question must be decided on its own facts.‖). 
 43 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1096–99 
(2007) (explaining the context-specific nature of the fair use analysis).  
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research,‖44 but also include more imprecise applications, such as 
those which generally involve some type of  ―transformative 
use.‖45  The factors themselves focus on (1) the purpose and 
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
46
 
The application of fair use in the context of higher education, 
and academic libraries in particular, is well recognized both in the 
literature and by the courts.
47
  Section 107, the statutory section 
which outlines fair use, specifically calls out uses for ―teaching, 
scholarship, and research‖ as being within the scope of the 
doctrine,
48
 and goes on to identify ―nonprofit educational 
purposes‖ as weighing at least one of the statutory factors toward a 
finding fair use.
49
  Further, although the burden of proving fair use 
 
 44 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
 45 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that 2 Live 
Crew‘s commercial parody of Roy Orbison‘s song ―Oh, Pretty Woman‖ was 
―transformative‖ (and fair use) because it changed the work by adding ―new expression, 
meaning, or message‖); Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a search engine‘s thumbnail reproduction of entire 
copyrighted images for inclusion in a search results page was ―transformative‖).  
 46 17 U.S.C. § 107. Note that the text merely states that ―[i]n determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include [the four factors].‖ Id. The purpose of the codification of fair use was to restate 
fair use, not to supplant the judge-made nature of the doctrine, and courts are still free to 
consider other factors and apply it to new areas, such as digital distribution in the context 
of academic libraries. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 21 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (―Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is 
and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present 
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.‖). 
 47 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that the fair use doctrine ―‗avoid[s] 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity that the law is designed to foster‘‖ (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495, U.S. 207, 236 
(1990))). See generally Carol M. Silberberg, Note, Preserving Educational Fair Use in 
the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001) (summarizing the state of fair 
use in higher education).  
 48 17 U.S.C. § 107. Note that three of the seven statutory examples (teaching, 
scholarship, and research) are uses directly facilitated by academic libraries.  
 49 Id. § 107(1) (―In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case 
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of 
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rests firmly on the defendant asserting the defense,
50
 there is at 
least some statutory and judicial warrant for a presumption that 
part of the fair use analysis weighs in favor of educational uses, 
especially in the context of non-profit libraries.
51
  Section 108, 
which grants additional, specific exceptions for library 
preservation purposes, provides that nothing in that section ―in any 
way affects the right of fair use.‖52  Although Section 108 has 
received virtually no judicial interpretation, the view that fair use is 
a right—not a defense—of libraries and their users is at least 
aspirationally shared by some librarians: 
Even though librarians likely hold other core values 
related to copyright, the last one critical to mention 
is fair use.  To librarians, fair use is a user‘s right 
and not just a defense to copyright infringement. . . . 
The word used in the statute is ―right‖ and not 
―privilege‖ . . . .53 
Further, the examples of fair uses (―criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research,‖54) provided in 
the preamble to section 107 are almost all types of uses that 
libraries facilitate.  While these examples of uses are afforded no 
 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes . . . .‖).  The commerciality or non-profit nature of the use is not, 
however, determinative. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (―[T]he mere fact that a use is 
educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any 
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness.‖). 
 50 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553 
(asserting fair use is an affirmative defense); id. at 9 n.3 (stating that the burden of 
proving fair use is always on the party asserting the defense); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569 
(raising fair use as an affirmative defense in response to a claim of infringement). 
 51 But see Brownmark Films, L.L.C. v. Comedy Partners, No. 10-CV-1013, 2011 WL 
2648600, at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 6, 2011) (―[T]he central issue is whether this court can 
resolve a motion to dismiss in the defendants‘ favor because of the existence of the 
affirmative defense of fair use. . . .  [but] an affirmative defense can be the basis for a 
dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) when the allegations of the complaint and 
material that expressly referenced the complaint and is central to the plaintiff‘s claim ‗set 
forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.‘‖) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 52 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (emphasis added). 
 53 Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment: Librarians Versus 
Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 115, 123 (2000). 
 54 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
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presumptive weight in the fair use analysis as a whole, at least 
some courts have held that uses in accord with these examples are 
entitled to a presumption that the first factor (―purpose and 
character of the use‖) weighs in favor of a finding of fair use.55  
Though no one factor is determinative,
56
 the first factor—termed 
the ―soul‖ of the fair use by some57—is highly correlated to a 
finding of fair use.
58
 
There are few cases that directly confront fair use in a non-
profit library setting.
59
  Indeed, the most frequently cited and 
influential cases for academic libraries come not from suits against 
 
 55 See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (―As we held in 
Wright, ‗there is a strong presumption that factor one favors the defendant if the allegedly 
infringing work fits the description of uses described in § 107.‘‖ (citing Wright v. Warner 
Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1991))). This view is contested as inconsistent 
with the Campbell Court‘s command against presumptions of fair use, but at least in the 
Second Circuit, the presumption lives on both in pre- and post-Campbell fair use cases. 
See 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:12 (Westlaw 2011) (citing the Wright decision and 
asserting that it is ―clearly erroneous and has been subsequently overruled by the 
Supreme Court‘s Campbell decision.‖). 
 56 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
 57 See Leval, supra note 45, at 116 (―Factor One is the soul of fair use.‖).  
 58 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 583–85 (2007) (describing the positive statistical 
relationship between a favorable finding under the first factor and the overall outcome in 
the fair use analysis).  
 59 See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2582 
(2009) (―There is relatively little caselaw on fair use in educational or research 
settings.‖).  In synthesizing fair use cases, Professor Samuelson goes on to explain that  
Because this Article principally aims to analyze clusters of decided 
fair use cases, there is relatively little it can say about how courts 
would apply fair use as to a wide array of educational and research 
uses that lie outside the negotiated guidelines. There are simply too 
few decisions to analyze . . . .  It is, however, fair to observe that the 
small number of litigated educational/research cases contrasts sharply 
with the very high volume of everyday educational and research uses 
that arguably implicate copyright . . . .  
Id. at 2586–87 (citations omitted). Cf. Defendants‘ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 35, 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2011), 
ECF No. 411 (―The Court has found no case on point with the present, dealing purely 
with the application of the fair use doctrine in the academic environment.‖). 
 There are now a few major cases that buck this trend. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. 
Patton, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 15, 2008) (Justia); Ass‘n for Info. 
Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., No. CV 10-09378 CBM (MANx) (C.D. 
Ca. filed Dec. 7, 2010) (Justia); The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 1:2011 CV 
06351 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 12, 2011).                                                                                                                                                 
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libraries at all, but against copyshops that created unlicensed 
coursepacks for classroom use.
60
  These ―copyshop‖ cases have 
uniformly failed to find fair use in the creation and sale of 
coursepacks,
61
 and have led libraries to adopt those rulings as 
fearsome precedent for their own practices.
62
  Those cases, 
however, place heavy emphasis on the commercial purpose of the 
use by the for-profit copyshops, and do not address how non-profit 
academic library uses may alter the analysis.
63
  Thus, even caselaw 
that provides a close analogy to library practices, as these 
copyshop cases do, may not be as instructive as librarians have 
presumed it to be. 
Non-profit educational uses are fondly touted as prime 
examples of acceptable fair use,
64
 but they have received less 
 
 60 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 
1996) (finding no fair use for a commercial copyshop that reproduced and distributed 
works for purchase by university students); Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko‘s Graphics Corp., 
758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  
 61 See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use 
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 641–52 (2001) (summarizing multiple ―copyshop‖ 
cases and finding consistent rejection of fair use in them). 
 62 See Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2585–86 ([―Copyshop‖ cases] have caused a good 
deal of agitation and anxiety in educational, library, and research communities, because 
they contribute to fears that publishers are pushing for a rule that if it can be licensed, it 
must be licensed . . . .‖). 
 63 One case, Addison-Wesley Publ‘g. Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-CIV-8333, 1983 WL 
1134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), was made out directly against educators, naming 
several faculty members in the complaint. See Edwin McDowell, Nine Publishers Sue 
N.Y.U., Charging Copyright Violation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1982, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/15/books/nine-publishers-sue-nyu-charging-copyright-
violation.html. This case was of particular importance to universities because publishers 
explicitly threatened other universities on the same grounds unless they would agree to 
abide by a very rigid set of guidelines for educational fair use.  See Crews, supra note 61, 
at 640 (―[Universities] followed it because the publishing industry sent hundreds of 
letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging them to adopt the 
guidelines or face a risk of litigation.‖ (citing Form Letter from Townsend Hoopes, 
President of the Ass‘n of Am. Publishers, Inc., to college and university administrators 
(June 10, 1983))). Although the case was settled, it has had a lasting impact on university 
and library practice in this area. See id.  
 64 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994) 
(contrasting commercial uses with educational uses, stating ―that the fact that a 
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to 
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖ (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985))).  
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definition by the courts than other uses.
65
  Given the ambiguity of 
the doctrine in the area of educational fair use, this absence of 
litigation is surprising.  Matters of legal certainty are rarely 
litigated,
66
 but uncertain and dynamic doctrines like fair use are 
regularly tested in the courts.
67 
 Indeed, fair use in general has been 
heavily litigated,
68
 but that litigation has remained focused on 
commercial or personal uses, and not higher education.
69
  The 
absence of litigation in this context seems to be partly the result of 
risk aversion on the part of academics who might otherwise assert 
fair use.
 70
  The net result is an educational fair use right that is 
 
 65 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5679 (―Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and 
over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.‖); see also Beebe, supra 
note 58, at 609–10 (noting that uses described as ―news‖ were ultimately successful in 
asserting fair use 78% of the time, and ―critical‖ uses 62% of the time, but that 
educational or research uses were less certain to succeed—ultimately only 40-48% of the 
time); Crews, supra note 61, at 664 (stating that while there are guidelines for acceptable 
fair use in educational settings, ―no court ever has read them into law in a legal 
decision.‖); Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2541, 2582 (arguing that fair use is in general 
―more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived‖ but 
recognizing that educational fair use in particular remains unsettled).  
 66 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984). The Priest-Klein hypothesis is that cases selected for 
litigation or settlement are not chosen at random, but are selected based on ―the expected 
costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information the parties possess 
about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.‖ 
Id. at 4. The most important assumption of their model is that litigants ―form rational 
estimates of the likely decision,‖ which are based, in part, on the settled or unsettled 
nature of the law. Id. 
 67 See generally Beebe, supra note 58 (reviewing nearly 300 fair use decisions decided 
between 1978 and 2005). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Silberberg, supra note 47, at 646. See also Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2582–
83. 
 70 Some have suggested that more certainty is needed for fair uses‘ benefits to be 
within the reach of certain classes of risk-averse users. These assertions have led to calls 
for the establishment of an administrative fair use rulemaking or adjudication board. See, 
e.g., Carroll, supra note 43, at 1087 (proposing the creation of a ―Fair Use Board‖); Mark 
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1413 (2004) (proposing an administrative 
dispute resolution process); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 395, 412–27 (2009) (offering two proposed models of administrative regulation of 
fair-use); David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11–15 (2006) (proposing a panel of ―Fair Use Arbiters‖ 
appointed by the Register of Copyright). A proposal for a similar body designed to 
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strong but ambiguous—a right that rights holders eagerly define 
away, and a right that librarians are unsure how to assert.
71
 
Despite higher-education‘s favored status in claiming fair use, 
the doctrine‘s ambiguity in this area has caused librarians and 
administrators to hesitate in taking advantage of its benefits.  
Academic librarians act as ―de facto arbiters of copyright practice 
for their institutions,‖72 yet many are reluctant to engage in a fair 
use analysis for fear of subjecting their institution to an 
infringement suit.  In many libraries, ―[d]ecisions are made on the 
basis of avoiding copyright difficulties rather than fulfilling [the] 
mission.‖73  The fear of fair use is fueled by a belief that the 
 
administer educational fair use has also been made.  See David A. Simon, Teaching 
Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 453, 527–49 (2010).  
 Most of these proposals are intent on solving two of fair uses‘ most vexing problems 
for would-be asserters. The first is that ―[l]iability for copyright infringement is strict,‖ 
because the exercise of any of the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights under Section 106 
makes the fair use asserter a prima facie infringer, who then has the burden of proving 
that fair use applies.  See Carroll, supra note 43, at 1098. The second is that the 
consequences for infringement are severe. Statutory damage awards can be as high as 
$150,000 per work infringed, and it is not uncommon for awards in some cases to reach 
into the millions. Id. at 1098–99.  
 For fair use in academic libraries, these two problems are less harsh. First, the 
burden of proving fair use by academic libraries (those that qualify for § 108 exceptions) 
may well be lower or even reversed as compared to other asserters of fair use. This theory 
is untested but, as noted above, supra note 52 and accompanying text, it carries at least 
some statutory weight. Furthermore the second problem is mitigated by the fact that 
nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives are excepted from statutory 
damages so long as they had reasonable grounds for believing the fair use determination 
weighed in favor of their use. The statute provides: 
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an 
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his 
or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, 
if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit 
educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of 
his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives 
itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or 
phonorecords . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).  
 71 PRUDENCE ADLER, BRANDON BUTLER, PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, FAIR 
USE CHALLENGES IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES 3 (2010), http://www. 
arl.org/bm~doc/arl_csm_fairusereport.pdf. 
 72 Id. at 5. 
 73 Id. at 19.  
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analysis is so complex, and the result of an incorrect determination 
so harmful, that fair use decisions must always be made 
conservatively, if at all.
74
 
This attitude extends to others in the university setting.  For 
example, the University of Texas ―Copyright Crash Course‖ for 
academics takes a position on fair use that is common in the 
academic environment by asking ―what is fair use?‖ 
We would all appreciate a clear, crisp answer . . . 
but far from clear and crisp, fair use is better 
described as a shadowy territory whose boundaries 
are disputed, more so now that it includes 
cyberspace than ever before. In a way, it‘s like a no-
man‘s land. Enter at your own risk.75 
 
 74 One recent study found that librarians generally believed that ―libraries incur high 
risks, including exposure to statutory damages, for good-faith efforts to employ fair use.‖ 
Id.  As discussed above, in many cases this fear is unfounded. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) 
(2006); Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 11 
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 461, 504 (2010) (discussing how non-profit academic libraries are 
excepted from statutory damage awards when asserting fair use).  
 This safe haven for educational non-profit fair use is one reason why academic 
library fair use determinations are unique. Otherwise, with a range of almost anywhere 
between $750 and $150,000 per work infringed the prospect of a statutory damage award 
in the face of an incorrect fair use determination can be financially ruinous. Many 
commentators and even some courts have concluded that awards on the high end of the 
range may be unconstitutional. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory 
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 
480–90 (2009) (arguing that statutory awards on the higher end of the given range are 
both ―plainly punitive‖ and ―grossly excessive,‖ violating Due Process as they go beyond 
the guideposts for punitive damage awards established by the Supreme Court in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996)); Memorandum of Law & 
Order at 8, 34–35, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. July 
27, 2011) (holding a statutory damage award unconstitutionally excessive even under the 
less rigorous standard for non-punitive awards). 
 75 Office of the General Counsel, California Institute of Technology, Fair Use, CAL. 
INST. OF TECH., http://www.ogc.caltech.edu/forms/fairuse (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). 
Since this paper was written, the University of Texas‘ ―Crash Course‖ has now tempered 
its assessment of fair use. See UNIV. OF TEX. LIBR., Copyright Crash Course: Fair Use of 
Copyrighted Materials, UNIV. OF TEX., http://copyright.lib.utexas.edu/copypol2.html (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2011).  
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Because of its inherent ambiguity, fair use is often a last resort 
for those hoping to find a way to use copyrighted content.
76
  Risk-
averse librarians faced with such uncertainty are unwilling or 
unable to marshal the resources necessary to make fair use 
determinations, and instead rely on licenses that provide a quick 
and a simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answer to each proposed use.77  Fair 
use analysis requires time, thought, and an understanding of the 
underlying legal and practical risks.  The legal education of 
librarians who would make these decisions, however, can be 
lacking or nonexistent,
78
 and even those comfortable with the 
analysis are forced to rely on a thin record of case law which 
addresses on-campus fair use only at the fringes.
79
 
Despite its ambiguity, asserting fair use in the university setting 
is important.  For one, assertion of the fair use right is, in many 
respects, an assertion of First Amendment free speech rights.  Fair 
use has been widely discussed as the copyright act‘s ―internal 
safety valve,‖80 protecting users‘ rights to free expression from 
excessive limitation by rights holders.  As copyright law has 
expanded over the last decades to extend the control of owners 
 
 76 For example, in ―The Five Step Approach for Analyzing Copyright Use Questions‖ 
for academics, fair use is the fourth of five steps (seeking permission is step five). The 
Five Step Approach For Analyzing Copyright Use Questions, J. MURREY ATKINS LIBR. 
UNC CHARLOTTE, http://library.uncc.edu/copyright/teaching/fivesteps (last visited Sept. 
14, 2011).  I do not to suggest that such an approach is inappropriate, but rather that 
turning to fair use as a last resort has become a reality given the current state of the law.  
 77 See Crews, supra note 61, at 695–97 (criticizing overreliance by both the courts and 
educational users on ―rigid‖ fair use guidelines, reiterating that ―[f]air use in [sic] an 
inherently flexible doctrine, dependent on the specifics of the relevant facts of each case 
. . . The Classroom Guidelines, the Multimedia Guidelines, and most of the fair-use 
guidelines make that crucial error with emphasis. They attempt to find and hit the bull‘s 
eye of a moving target.‖). 
 78 See Cross & Edwards, supra note 32, at 541; see also David R. Hansen, William M. 
Cross & Phillip M. Edwards, Copyright Policy and Practice in Electronic Reserves 
Among ARL Libraries, 73 C. & RES. LIBR. 23 (forthcoming 2012) (finding that in a recent 
survey of ARL libraries on electronic course reserve practices, more than half of 
respondents reported that paraprofessionals and other non-librarians were primarily 
responsible for adherence to university copyright guidelines). 
 79 See, e.g., Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 495 (noting the lack of case law 
precedent in certain on-campus fair use issues).   
 80 See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the conflicted relationship 
between copyright and the First Amendment).  
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even further, fair use has taken on added importance as a tool used 
by courts to harmonize the often conflicting goals of copyright and 
the First Amendment.
81
  Free speech benefits are amplified in the 
educational setting where academic freedom values are of 
particular concern.
82
 
In addition to free speech benefits, a healthy fair use doctrine is 
thought to promote a degree of social justice and equality among 
institutions of higher education.
83
  Wealthier institutions are able to 
license access to more content, can afford to hire copyright 
specialists to enable alternative uses, and can afford to evaluate 
and, potentially, litigate fair use claims.
84
  Institutions with fewer 
resources, however, are caught in a double bind.  On the one hand, 
less content is licensed because of the rising costs of electronic-
content licenses;
85
  while on the other hand, assertions of fair use—
which, if correctly determined, would allow free, unauthorized 
uses—are thought to pose a risk beyond which the institution can 
afford to defend.
86
  As explained below,
87
 because the strength of 
fair use is in some ways dependent on how frequently it is relied 
upon, a strong and sustained effort to assert fair use reduces the 
risk for all institutions, and thus maintains a semblance of equality.  
This has led some scholars to conclude that ―[t]he educational 
community must assert and defend fair use if it is to retain some 
 
 81 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech 
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537, 543 (2004) (describing recent 
copyright legislation as a ―one-way ratchet,‖ granting more rights for longer periods of 
time, and explaining that fair use must be reinforced to maintain its role as copyright‘s 
―built-in free speech safeguard,‖ harmonizing copyright restrictions with the First 
Amendment). 
 82 Id. at 587. 
 83 See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 464–65. 
 84 Id. at 464, 529. 
 85 See Kittie S. Henderson & Stephen Bosch, Seeking the New Normal: Periodicals 
Price Survey 2010, 135 LIBR. J. 36, 36 (2010) (discussing the trend toward decreasing 
library budgets, especially for state-supported libraries, amidst increasing subscription 
costs for, among other things, electronic content).  
 86 See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 465; Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright 
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 45–46 (1996) (―[F]air use is a 
troublesome privilege because it requires a hideously expensive trial to prove that one‘s 
actions come within its shelter.‖). 
 87 See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.  
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autonomy over academic content and preserve some equity in the 
delivery of its mission.‖88 
The assertion of fair use is also an important end in itself.  
Because fair use is context-specific and relies heavily on previous 
applications in factually-analogous situations,
89
 the less fair use is 
actually asserted, the less important it becomes.  Exercise of fair 
use in new and changing environments, as in the world of digital 
content, is the only way to maintain fair use‘s relevance; unused, 
the right will atrophy.
90
 
This is especially true in the face of mass-licensing schemes 
that are now available to academic libraries.
91
  Recall the fourth 
fair use factor, ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.‖92  If libraries seek licenses to 
cover uses that would otherwise be permissible under fair use, the 
potential market expands, thereby decreasing the strength of fair 
use.
93
  In examining this ―doctrinal feedback,‖ Professor James 
Gibson describes the result as ―a steady, incremental, and 
unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than 
ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright 
users.‖94  Educational fair use already suffers from a dearth of case 
law.  Contractual terms that make libraries and their users unable 
to exert fair use in at least the ways that are currently agreed upon 
 
 88 Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 529. 
 89 See id. at 484, 488. 
 90 See id. at 530. 
 91 See, e.g., Annual Copyright License for Academic Institutions, COPYRIGHT 
CLEARANCE CTR., http://www.copyright.com/content/cc3/en/toolbar/productsAnd 
Solutions/annualLicenseAcademic.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 92 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
 93 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007) (―This practice of unneeded licensing feeds back into 
doctrine because of one final uncontroversial premise: the fair use defense looks to the 
existence vel non of a licensing market when defining the reach of the copyright 
entitlement. The result is a steady, incremental, and unintended expansion of copyright, 
caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of 
copyright users.‖ ). 
 94 Id. at 887. See also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair 
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 971 (2007) (―[A] copyright owner can nearly always 
argue that she has suffered harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license 
fee for the use being challenged.‖). 
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as acceptable will result in even less definition of the right in this 
context. 
Each of the above-listed benefits of a strong and regularly 
asserted fair use is diminished, or in extreme cases, extinguished 
by overreaching licenses.  By either completely removing fair use 
(―The Licensee has no rights in or to the Licensed Materials other 
than as set forth herein‖) or by narrowly defining terms 
(―Permissible uses of a ‗Reasonable Amount‘ shall mean not more 
than 10 percent of the content contained in the Licensed 
Materials‖),95 the deliberately indefinite bounds of fair use are 
reigned in to encompass only a fraction of its potential scope.
96
  A 
license term that removes fair use and replaces it with ―ten 
percent,‖ ―thirty seconds‖ or any other such contrived number will 
certainly give users more confidence about  their use decision, but 
the reduced risk also strips fair use of one of its most important 
attributes—the ability to adapt and conform to new and creative 
uses.
97
 
Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which 
licenses impose these restrictions (many licenses contain non-
disclosure clauses that prohibit libraries from advertising such 
details),
98
 at a certain level it does not matter.  The fact that these 
limitation clauses exist at all hinders the ability of students, faculty, 
staff, and librarians to make assertions of fair use because they 
cannot be sure that their time and effort in making that 
determination will be of any use.
99
  Users rarely, if ever, 
investigate the license terms of each and every database they use 
because the transaction costs of such an investigation are too 
great.
100
  Instead, users make decisions based on incomplete 
information about particular license terms, and when that 
incomplete information is tainted by a fear that fair use is not 
 
 95 Stanley Wilder, The Erosion of Fair Use Protections for Digital Scholarship, 
CHARLESTON ADVISOR 57, 57–58 (2011), http://www.carli.illinois.edu/mem-serv/mem-
train/1104ereslicensing/Erosion_of_fair_use.pdf (discussing both examples).  
 96 Id.  
 97 See id. 
 98 Ellen Finnie Duranceau, License Compliance, 26 SERIALS REV. 53, 57 (2000). 
 99 Id. at 53. 
 100 Id. at 55. 
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permitted, the costly, time-consuming fair use analysis will simply 
be avoided.
101
  Any solution that truly encourages fair use 
determinations must not only make the fair use analysis a valid 
exercise (by removing restrictive license terms), but must also 
make it known that the right is generally a beneficial one that may 
be freely asserted without the extra step of a time-consuming 
investigation into confusing contractual terms. 
B. Proposed Solutions 
Contractual alteration of copyright‘s ―delicate balance‖ 
between user and author rights is well debated and a number of 
proposals to preserve that balance have been suggested.
102
  This 
section outlines three general categories of proposals, specifically 
focusing on model licenses, federal preemption, and the 
modification of state contract law.  Each of these solutions is 
appealing, but for a variety of reasons none has emerged as a 
viable solution to preserving fair use in the face of mass academic-
library licensing. 
1. Model Licenses 
The most obvious remedy to restrictive licensing terms is to 
ask negotiating librarians not to agree to terms that give up or 
modify the right of fair use for their library users.  Indeed, as 
University Librarian Stanley Wilder points out, ―there is no reason 
to believe that contract law should be more conducive to the 
erosion of fair use principles.  Licenses are agreements, after all, 
requiring the consent of both parties.‖103  To this end, a number of 
model licenses and best practices have been developed specifically 
for academic libraries.
104
  These guidelines offer librarians a 
uniform contractual base that preserves important rights like fair 
use.
105
  The sheer number of these model licenses is a testament to 
how important the underlying goal is.  The number, and indeed the 
 
 101 See id. 
 102 See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 616 (2008) (reviewing the debate).  
 103 See, e.g., Wilder, supra note 95, at 57.  
 104 See id. at 58. 
 105 See id.  
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growth in new models, also speaks to how few of these licenses 
have been adopted consistently by libraries. 
All of the following groups have created guidelines for license 
language that seeks to, at a minimum, preserve the existing scope 
of fair use: American Association of Law Libraries,
106
 Association 
of Research Libraries,
107
 Council on Library Resources/Digital 
Library Federation,
108
 International Coalition of Library 
Consortia,
109
 International Federation of Library Associations, 
North Eastern Research Libraries Consortium,
110
 and the National 
Information Standards Organization.
111
  Notably, all of these 
guidelines are based on the idea that librarians can, and should, 
negotiate with vendors to preserve rights like fair use. 
Preserving fair use in the license terms themselves is a laudable 
goal and should be taken up wholeheartedly by librarians who 
negotiate their institutions‘ licenses.  The achievement of this goal, 
however, has been a long time coming.  Librarians have been 
proposing model language and guidelines for decades,
112
 but there 
is little evidence that publishers are receptive to or even aware of 
 
 106 Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, SPECIAL LIBR. ASS‘N (1997),  
http://www.sla.org/content/SLA/advocacy/infobank/principles.cfm.  
 107 Copyright & Intellectual Property Policies, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., 
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 30, 2011); see also 
Licensing, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/sc/marketplace/license/index.shtml 
(last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 108 CLIR/DLF Model License, YALE UNIV. LIBR. LIBLICENSE, 
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/standlicagree.1st.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 109 Statement of Current Perspective and Preferred Practices for the Selection and 
Purchase of Electronic Information, INT‘L COAL. OF LIBR. CONSORTIA (ICOLC), 
http://www.library.yale.edu/consortia/statement.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 110 NorthEast Research Libraries Consortium Generic License Agreement for 
Electronic Resources, NE. RES. LIBR. CONSORTIUM (2008), http://www.library. 
yale.edu/NERLpublic/NERLGenericLicjeRev092410.pdf.  
 111 Shared Electronic Resource Understanding, NAT‘L INFO. STANDARDS ORG. (2008), 
http://www.niso.org/publications/rp/RP-7-2008.pdf.  
 112 See Charles W. Bailey, Jr., Legal Issues: License Agreements, SCHOLARLY ELEC. 
PUBL‘G BIBLIOGRAPHY § 5.2, http://digital-scholarship.org/sepb/llicense.htm (last updated 
Oct. 30, 3011) (outlining the long history of literature on library licensing issues and the 
many proposals and adoptions of model licensing language); see, e.g., Trisha L. Davis, 
License Agreements in Lieu of Copyright: Are We Signing Away Our Rights?, 21 LIBR. 
ACQUISITIONS: PRAC. & THEORY 19, 19–27 (1997). 
HANSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  1:57 PM 
2011] USING STATE LAW TO PRESERVE FAIR USE 23 
librarians‘ concerns.113  Librarians are, as Wilder points out, still 
―play[ing] defense‖ with regard to licensing terms.114  The problem 
will only grow as licensing continues to become an even bigger 
part of the way librarians provide access to content.  This is 
especially true given the proliferation of more consumer-oriented 
products (and more electronic content generally).
115
  With 
copyright owners presenting these adhesion contracts, libraries 
may have little chance to ―play offense‖ and assert their own 
preferred license terms.
116
 
These standard-form, non-negotiable contracts present one area 
of concern that model licenses cannot reach.  Netflix, for example, 
is a DVD and streaming video subscription service whose primary 
customer is a consumer, not a library.
117
  As Netflix has grown, 
libraries have added subscriptions with hopes of capitalizing on the 
Netflix collection.
118
  Netflix‘s license terms, however, are 
presented as non-negotiable, standard-form contracts directed at 
consumers;
119
  they do not contemplate library lending, and in fact, 
limit the Netflix service and content to ―personal and non-
commercial use.‖120  As a result, libraries that lend out Netflix-
owned DVDs to library users face potential legal action for 
violating the terms of use.
121
 
 
 113 Examples of aggressive licensing terms that restrict users‘ rights abound. Some of 
the more egregious vendor terms are cataloged here: Peggy Hoon, Running In Circles: 
Copyright, Licensing, and the Educational Environment, COLLECTANEA BLOG (Feb. 19, 
2011, 9:13 AM), http://www-apps.umuc.edu/blog/collectanea/2011/02/running-in-circles-
copyright-l.html. 
 114 Wilder, supra note 95.  
 115 See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51, 65–66 (1997) (discussing the development of a new market for 
electronic informational services and tools).  
 116 See id. at 66, 71; Peggy Hoon, If You Build It, Will They Come? Customizable 
Licensing, COLLECTANEA BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 1:16 PM) http://www-apps. 
umuc.edu/blog/collectanea/2011/04/if-you-build-it-will-they-come.html (addressing the 
practice of allowing libraries to suggest their own licensing terms). 
 117 See Travis Kaya, Academic Libraries Add Netflix Subscriptions, CHRONICLE OF 
HIGHER ED.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (Sept. 18, 2010, 10:34 AM), http://chronicle. 
com/blogs/wiredcampus/academic-libraries-add-netflix-subscriptions/27018.   
 118 See id.  
 119 See generally Terms of Use, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/termsofuse  (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2011).   
 120 Id.  
 121 See Kaya, supra note 117.  
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Even with traditional academic publishers, libraries can be left 
out of the licensing picture.  West Publishing (―West‖), a large 
legal publisher that sells millions of dollars worth of licensed 
content to academic law libraries, recently released an ―interactive 
casebook series‖ to accompany purchases of print casebooks.122  
Although West is surely aware that it sells casebooks to law 
libraries (and that law librarians—typically lawyers themselves—
will be particularly aware of licensing terms), the license for the 
interactive casebook series is directed solely toward students.  It 
strictly limits the use of the interactive casebook  to ―coursework at 
law school or for bar preparation,‖123 but gives no indication as to 
whether these uses may be personal or institutional.  Moreover, it 
is silent on the issue of whether libraries are permitted to access 
content on behalf of users.  Stock licenses like these, which leave 
no opportunity for negotiation, are blunt-force instruments that 
achieve the goals of neither the library nor the publisher.  But 
libraries, increasingly forced to act as purchasing agents for 
consumer-users, simply do not have a way to assert alternative 
licensing terms for these products. 
Admittedly, Nextflix and West‘s interactive casebook are 
examples of products that are relatively unimportant in the grand 
scheme of the electronic content to which academic libraries 
provide access.  They are, however, good illustrations of the 
limited usefulness of model licenses.  Model license language is 
only effective if publishers are willing to negotiate.  As the world 
of licensed electronic content grows, it is unlikely that libraries 
will represent a large enough segment of the customer population 
to warrant special attention from publishers in all areas, and 
without that attention, there is no ―playing defense‖ or ―playing 
 
 122 West Interactive Casebook Series, INTERACTIVE CASEBOOK SERIES, 
http://interactivecasebook.com/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 123 License Agreement, INTERACTIVE CASEBOOK SERIES, http://interactivecasebook. 
com/license/licenseagreement.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). Read literally, these 
license terms would seem to prohibit faculty use as well, although the site registration 
form clearly contemplates faculty registration. See Create a New Account, INTERACTIVE 
CASEBOOK SERIES, http://interactivecasebook.com/register.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 
2011) (allowing for special registration for law school faculty in order to gain access to 
―Professor Only‖ materials). To its credit, the license does specifically allow for uses ―as 
allowed under the fair use provision of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.A. § 107).‖ Id.   
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offense.‖124  There is no game at all.  These areas of consumer-
oriented licensing are growing, and for library users who are 
making costly and time-consuming fair use decisions, the added 
burden of evaluating multifarious licensing terms is great.
125
  Thus, 
model licenses, even if uniformly adopted and vigorously 
negotiated (which they are not), can only ease a portion of the 
burden imposed by a licensing culture, and must still accept 
consumer-oriented licenses that are outside the model licenses‘ 
reach. 
2. Federal Preemption 
One of the most appealing proposals, at least from a legal 
perspective, is the suggestion that Congress or the courts should 
declare that federal copyright law—and in particular, the right of 
fair use—preempts any contract provisions to the contrary.126  The 
logic is straight forward: licenses are creatures of state contract 
law, and state laws are generally valid only so long as they do not 
conflict with federal law on the same subject matter.
127
  Federal 
 
 124 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 115, at 66 (discussing the low bargaining 
power of database users or customers).  
 125 See Gasaway, supra note 53, at 154–55. 
 126 See Bohannan, supra note 102, at 629–35. A less drastic variation would be one that 
supports preemption only for specific contract provisions that purport to restrict the 
limitations on exclusive rights, such as the fair use right, if the contract is not non-
negotiable. Such an approach has been proposed in Congress but has failed. See Benefit 
Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act 
of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) (―When a digital work is distributed to the public 
subject to nonnegotiable license terms, such terms shall not be enforceable under the 
common laws or statutes of any State to the extent that they restrict or limit any of the 
limitations on exclusive rights under this title.‖). See also Kevin Smith, Copyright 
Renewal for Libraries: Seven Steps Toward a User-Friendly Law, 10 PORTAL: LIBR. AND 
THE ACAD. 5, 9–11 (2010) (discussing the proposal). This approach would potentially be 
easier to implement than wholesale preemption, but because the language of the existing 
preemption statute is specifically worded, it would be difficult for courts to read in such a 
restriction under the existing law. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
Furthermore, as a legislative solution, such a proposal would suffer from many of the 
same problems as wholesale preemption would, but the difficultly may be less 
exaggerated. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. These uncertainties suggest 
that this option should be further explored.   
 127 This is only a rough generalization of the actual rule. Federal preemption can follow 
two routes, ―express preemption‖ (where the statute explicitly states that it preempts state 
law) or ―implied preemption,‖ which, in turn, can take the form of either ―conflict 
preemption‖ (where courts must determine whether the state law actually conflicts with 
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law is, in the words of the Constitution‘s supremacy clause, the 
―supreme law of the land.‖128  Because copyright and the right of 
fair use are created by federal law, those rights should not be 
alterable by state-law created contracts.  This position is supported 
by the fact that the courts, under an express provision of the 
copyright act which directs the courts to find preemption for 
―equivalent rights,‖129 have regularly held that federal copyright 
law preempts state laws granting ―equivalent rights‖ to those 
enumerated in the federal copyright law.
130
 
Federal preemption has a number of strengths. It would 
produce a uniform, nationwide rule.  It would also more 
legitimately restore the current imbalance of rights between users 
and copyright holders; if Congress used federal law to create a 
balance of rights, then federal law should be used to maintain that 
balance.  Although there is some concern about how such a 
federal-only rule would work,
131
 these benefits, among others, 
have led many to support this approach to preemption.
132
 
Despite scholarly commentary that roundly supports federal 
preemption of contract restrictions,
133
 courts have generally 
 
the purpose of the federal statute) or ―field preemption‖ (where the federal statutory 
scheme is so broad as to ―occupy the field‖ in that area of law). A thorough discussion of 
preemption doctrine in the context of copyright can be found in 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (LexisNexis 2011) [hereinafter 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 128 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 129 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).  
 130 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 1.01[B][1][b]–[k]  (discussing cases 
that have held that federal law preempts certain state law claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, invasion of privacy or publicity, defamation, deceptive trade practices, 
misappropriation, unjust enrichment, trade secrets, conversion, trespass, and other causes 
of action).  
 131 For example, if state contract law is preempted as a whole with respect to 
copyrighted works, what contract law would apply? Federal common law?  
 132 Bohannan, supra note 102, at 622–30. 
 133 See id. at 634 (―[T]he thrust of the scholarly criticism of ProCD has been that 
contracts, especially form contracts such as shrinkwrap licenses, alter the ‗delicate 
balance‘ of rights established by the Copyright Act, and must therefore be preempted.‖). 
See also Maureen A. O‘Rourke, Drawing the Boundary between Copyright and 
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995); 
Joel R. Wolfson, Contracts and Copyright are not at War: A Reply to ―The 
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand‖, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999); Kathleen K. 
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concluded that contracts which modify or replace copyright-related 
rights are nonetheless valid.
134
  In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
135
 
Judge Easterbrook reasoned, 
Rights ―equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright‖ are rights 
established by law—rights that restrict the options 
of persons who are strangers to the author. . . . 
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their 
parties; strangers may do as they please, so 
contracts do not create ―exclusive rights.‖136 
Thus, the court concluded that ―a simple two-party contract is 
not ‗equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright‘ and therefore may be enforced.‖137 
While other courts have taken a less categorical approach to 
preemption,
138
 the general point remains that contractual 
restrictions on usage are valid, even when those restrictions 
conflict with federal rights such as fair use.
139
  Many federal 
circuits have adopted some version of the ProCD holding,
140
 and 
 
Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional Preemption of 
Contract-Based Claims,  11 COMM. L.  & POL‘Y 83, 84 (2006). 
 134 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 1.01[B][1][a][iii].  
 135 86 F.3d 1447 (1996). 
 136 Id. at 1454. 
 137 Id. at 1455.  
 138 E.g., Nat‘l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comp. Assocs. Int‘l, 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 
1993) (implicitly adopting the ―extra element‖ rule, whereby a contractual obligation 
constitutes an ―extra element‖ for enforcement that goes beyond the bare exclusive rights 
granted by copyright).  The extra element approach, in at least some circuits, is in reality 
just as categorical—the only extra element that needs to be proved is that a contractual 
promise exists in addition to the underlying exclusive right granted by § 106. See 
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 139 While recognizing that it is the courts that have been the source of the current 
contract preemption rule, recent reform efforts continue to hope that the judiciary will 
reverse course on the issue. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The 
Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 60 
(2010) (presenting a list of factors to consider in the preemption analysis, but noting that 
―[t]hese factors are not intended as a multi-part balancing test or for statutory 
codification, but rather as suggestions for some considerations relevant to resolving, 
through case-by-case development, the ultimate question of whether enforcing a given 
contract right in a given set of circumstances will frustrate copyright‘s purposes.‖). 
 140 Bohannan, supra note 102, at 633. 
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there is little evidence that the courts are looking to reverse course 
on this issue.
141
 
Congress could, in theory, change the preemption rule to make 
it clear that state contract terms are preempted.  In reality, 
however, such a change is unlikely.  Such a change in course on 
this issue would almost certainly result in an expansion of users‘ 
rights in the Copyright Act
142—something Congress has rarely 
done before.  In fact, over the last century, copyright has expanded 
to give authors and their assignees more rights over more formats 
for a longer period of time.
143
  An expansion of users‘ rights would 
be unprecedented and extremely difficult.
144
  This area of the law 
is subject to intense lobbying
145
 pulling the politics toward more 
rights for holders of concentrated blocks of copyrights, and away 
from the rights of individual or even institutional users.  Further, 
although some in Congress have signaled a willingness to consider 
users‘ rights issues, the past two Congresses have produced over 
thirty copyright-related bills, only one of which would have even 
arguably expanded users‘ rights.146  Political attitudes can, of 
course, change quickly, and the scope of users‘ rights is not set in 
stone. At the federal level,
147
 however, an apparent disparity 
 
 141 See, e.g., BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 614–17 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reviewing the Second Circuit intra-circuit split on preemption and 
noting an overall trend toward following ProCD, the court opted to adopt the reasoning 
of Judge Easterbrook‘s ProCD decision).  
 142 See Samuelson & Members of the CPP, supra note 139, at 59–62 (noting that failing 
to change course, and allowing such preemption, places limitations on users‘ rights).  
 143 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, §1-TL.  In 1962, Congress extended the 
copyright term from a maximum of 56 to 75 years, then the Copyright Act of 1976 
extended the term further to cover the life of the author plus 50 years. Id. §1-OV. Finally, 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension act then extended the term even further to 
cover the life of the author plus 70 years. Id. During this period, Congress has also 
extended protection to works such as computer software and architectural works. Id.   
 144 This is despite the numerous proposals for copyright reform, focusing particularly 
on the fair use right. See, e.g., supra note 66.  
 145 According to the Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, nearly a billion dollars 
were spent last year on lobbying related to issues of ―COPYRIGHT / PATENT / 
TRADEMARK.‖ See LDA Reports, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ 
Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  
 146 See Copyright Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/ 
legislation/archive (last visited Aug. 12, 2011) (listing copyright-related bills dating back 
to the 105th Congress).  
 147 See LDA Reports, supra note 145.  
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currently exists: the relative lobbying strength of parties primarily 
concerned with greater copyright protection for authors is much 
greater than those whose primary concern is access (such as 
academic libraries).  Accordingly, Congress‘s interest in 
addressing these issues is likely limited. 
Still, options remain to change the law on this point; courts 
could reverse the trend toward finding no preemption, or Congress 
could act.  But given the inaction of both the courts and Congress 
over the last two decades—a period of time in which the ―debate 
has been raging‖ over contractual preemption148—such a change 
seems unlikely.  Academic library users must look elsewhere for 
the time being. 
3. Wholesale Modification of State Contract Law 
A wholesale modification of state contract law is another way 
to address the issue.  Although not well discussed by scholars, 
states could simply decide that any contractual provisions—as 
between any grouping of public or private parties—which limit or 
modify the right of fair use are void as against public policy.  This 
approach, while worthy of further investigation, seems unlikely to 
be easily implemented by either federal or state courts, or by state 
legislatures. 
Federal courts, for their part, are unlikely to alter state contract 
law in any meaningful way because it is simply not theirs to alter.  
As discussed above, federal courts have accepted as a matter of 
course that ―state law determines the rights and obligations arising 
under a publishing contract that assigns a copyright.‖149  While 
federal courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over state law 
contract claims that are supplemental or ancillary to an underlying 
federal claim (such as copyright infringement),
150
 expanding or 
modifying settled issues in state law is decidedly outside the realm 
 
 148 Bohannan, supra note 102, at 616.  
 149 Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 150 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). The original grant of jurisdiction over copyright suits 
comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006), although general federal question jurisdiction, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), would also seem to be sufficient.  
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of permissible federal court activity.
151
  Thus, federal courts will 
apply state law as it exists, and will not initiate changes. 
State courts, which have traditionally played an important role 
in developing contract law, are also unlikely to alter the law in this 
area for at least two reasons.  First, courts are conservative when it 
comes to changing contract law.  Exceptions to the principle of 
freedom of contract—cast as public policy exceptions and viewed 
as consumer protections—are difficult to initiate152 and raise 
 
 151 See, e.g., Railroad Comm‘n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–501 (1943) 
(―But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape 
being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning of [the state 
law] . . . belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of [the 
state]. . . . Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal 
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies. . . . These cases 
reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal 
courts, ‗exercising a wise discretion,‘ restrain their authority because of ‗scrupulous 
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments‘ and for the smooth 
working of the federal judiciary.‖).  
 152 Almost always prefaced by language such as ―that parties are free to contract for 
whatever terms on which they may agree,‖ Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276 
Conn. 314, 326, 885 A.2d 734, 742 (2005), courts have most often created public policy 
exceptions with respect to exculpatory provisions that seek to insulate one party from her 
own ordinary negligence. See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:22 (4th ed. 2011). The 
factors that justify these exceptions, however, also provide a powerful argument for the 
acceptance of a ―fair use‖ public policy exception:  
Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction 
which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It 
concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a 
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of 
practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds 
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the 
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain 
established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the 
service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking 
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength 
against any member of the public who seeks his services. In 
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public 
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no 
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees 
and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the 
transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under 
the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the 
seller or his agents.  
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445–46 (Cal. 1963). 
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serious concerns from courts about paternalism and the role of the 
court in creating, and possibly conflicting with, other public 
policies. 
153
 
Second, even if state courts wanted to address this issue, state 
courts never have the opportunity to actually hear contract disputes 
in the copyright context.  Federal district courts are explicitly 
granted original jurisdiction over copyright cases,
154
 and that 
jurisdiction is ―exclusive of the courts of the states.‖155  Exclusive 
jurisdiction means that federal courts—and only federal courts—
can hear copyright disputes.
156
  Because licensing disputes are 
invariably tied to an underlying copyright claim (necessarily so, if 
fair use is asserted), the federal courts are the only forum available 
to hear both copyright and contract claims together.  Thus, state 
courts are in the curious position of never having an opportunity to 
clarify what their own law is, while federal courts are obliged to 
conservatively apply state law as they believe it currently exists. 
While the courts may be unable to properly address the issue, 
state legislatures may.  In the past, state legislatures have indicated 
some willingness to modify contract law to deal with electronic 
licensing issues.  The Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act (―UCITA,‖ formerly UCC Article 2B)157 was designed to be 
 
 153 Although more reflection is necessary, such a change in the general rules of contract 
construction could arguably cause a conflict with ―copyright policy‖ (perhaps a principle 
of freedom of contract, as implied in ProCD), and may be overridden by federal law. 
―Usually, state law rules of contract construction do not violate federal copyright policy, 
and the two work hand in glove. . . . But, if and to the extent that such dissonance may 
occur, the state law, of course, must give way to the federal policy.‖ NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 10.08.  Whatever these policy conflicts are, they have been 
described as ―extreme situations.‖ See Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int‘l., Inc., 661 
F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (―It is possible to hypothesize situations where application 
of particular state rules of construction would so alter rights granted by the copyright 
statutes as to invade the scope of copyright law or violate its policies. We need not, 
however, set forth these extreme situations.‖). 
 154 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006). 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id.  
 157 UCC Art. 2B (1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/ucc2/2b498.htm; UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999) 
[hereinafter UCITA] available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita 
200.htm.  The UCITA was originally proposed as part of UCC Art. 2B, but is now a 
separate act. See Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by 
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adopted by states as a way to uniformly regulate license terms 
related to software purchases, online databases, software access 
contracts and similar transactions.  The UCITA, as it happens, was 
strongly opposed by libraries as an affront to library services like 
interlibrary loan and library lending of electronic media like CD-
ROMs and DVDs.
158
  Librarians argued that it would also ―restrict 
traditional ‗fair use‘ of a product by defining what rights buyers 
have in relation to an information product‖ by validating licenses 
terms that are hidden ―deep within online licenses that are not 
readily available before purchase.‖159  In the end, only two states—
Virginia and Maryland—adopted the UCITA,160 and four states 
have instead adopted so-called ―bomb shelter‖ legislation to shield 
their residents from being subject to UCITA-governed contracts.
161
  
While it has been more than ten years since the UCITA was 
proposed,
162
 its existence and the states‘ reaction with bomb shelter 
legislation indicates at least a willingness on the part of state 
legislatures to address the issues, albeit in different ways. 
Modification of state contract law as a whole, however, is a 
major undertaking that would have a widespread impact on 
consumers and businesses.  A more in-depth study is necessary to 
determine how state contract law may be modified to preserve fair 
use and other federally-created rights.  Because states have been 
hesitant to rush into studying or implementing such sweeping 
changes, this paper makes a more modest proposal. 
II. A RESTRICTION ON PUBLIC ACADEMIC LICENSING 
To protect the scope of fair use in the academic environment, 
this paper proposes that state legislatures impose a limited 
 
NCCUSL as Separate Act, ALI REP.  (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R2103_ 
Art2b.htm. 
 158 See UCITA Impact on Libraries, AM. LIBR. ASS‘N, http://www.ala.org/ala/ 
issuesadvocacy/copyright/ucita/impact.cfm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 159 Id. 
 160 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-101 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
501.9 (West 2011). 
 161 See IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2011), VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9 § 2463a (2011); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2011).  
 162 See UCITA, supra note 158. 
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restriction, applicable only to public institutions of higher 
education, that would render void any license terms that purport to 
eliminate or modify the scope of fair use for its users.  For legal, 
equitable, and practical reasons, the restriction would apply only to 
new contracts entered into after the act‘s effective date,163 and 
would reach only to those institutions that are acting as arms of the 
state.
164
 
A. Proposed Text 
Restrictions on contract terms between private parties and state 
institutions are fairly common.  In North Carolina, for example, 
state institutions are prohibited from agreeing to a whole host of 
contract terms, including provisions that provide for: acceleration 
of payment, arbitration, assignment of rights, governing law, 
indemnity, hold harmless, assumption of liability, limitation of 
liability, liquidated damages, material breach, irreparable harm, 
statute of limitations, and non-compete clauses.
165
  An additional 
requirement that state institutions may not contract away the right 
of fair use for its users would not represent a significant burden on 
state institutions either in terms of compliance or actual licensing 
expenditures. 
The draft text below is but one way to approach this issue.  It is 
offered as a point of discussion for one possible implementation of 
this proposal.  Although drafted as part of the statutory law of a 
given state, the contract restrictions described below could easily 
be implemented as either a state regulation, or as a university 
governing-board level policy.
166
  As long as the provisions are 
non-waivable and are binding on the institution for all contracts, 
 
 163 Applying the change retroactively may run afoul of the Constitutional command that 
―No State shall . . . pass any bill . . . or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.‖ U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
21–32 (1977) (explaining the application of the Contract Clause to modifications of 
government contracts).  
 164 As opposed to private institutions that only incidentally receive some minimal level 
of state funding.  
 165 See Negotiating Prohibited Contract Clauses, OFF. OF LEG. AFFAIRS, UNC 
CHARLOTTE, http://legal.uncc.edu/prohibitedclauses.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).  
 166 See 1 GOV‘T CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. & PROCS. § 1.120 (2011) (noting the diverse 
ways that state and local governments structure their procurement statutes).  
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the effect would be the same.  A more complete example of 
proposed text for this Act is attached as an appendix to this paper.  
The first part of the proposed act lays the groundwork for licensing 
practices regarding fair use provisions. It provides 
No publicly supported college or university, as 
defined in [statutory definition], shall enter into any 
contract or license which alters, restricts, or 
eliminates any of the fair use rights or defenses 
granted in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United 
States Code. State supported colleges and 
universities may comply with this provision by 
incorporating the following language: [compliance 
language]. 
This provision disallows universities themselves from entering 
into contracts that restrict fair use.  Although such language may 
not be completely necessary given the second paragraph (below, 
which renders void those contract terms anyway), the first 
paragraph forestalls any equitable defense of estoppel or waiver 
that vendors could potentially raise if institutions continued to 
assent to restrictive contract terms, even while knowing that the 
terms themselves should be rendered void.
167
  This term also 
ensures that licenses on file with the institution would not contain 
restrictive language, allowing librarians and users to confidently 
assert fair use for the licensed works without second guessing the 
validity of the contract. 
The first paragraph leaves open the definition of ―state 
supported college or university.‖  Many states already have 
statutory definitions or lists of state-funded academic institutions 
that would be appropriate for reference here.
168
  The important 
 
 167 This concern may not be well-founded, but is included in an abundance of caution. 
A defense of waiver or estoppel would be unlikely to succeed given the second 
paragraph. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 369 (2011) (―Generally, as between the parties to a 
contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against 
public policy. Thus, an agreement which is void as against public policy, or because 
prohibited by law, cannot be rendered valid by invoking the doctrine of estoppel.‖). 
 168 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115D-2 (2011) (defining community colleges); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 116-2 (2011) (defining constituent institutions of the University of North 
Carolina System). Other states leave the definition of specific entities to state agencies. 
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point is that states should be as inclusive as possible and capture as 
many state-funded institutions as possible within the definition.  As 
discussed above,
169
 the inability of underfunded institutions to 
freely exercise and challenge fair use determinations contributes to 
the inequity of access to information as between those institutions 
and their well-funded counterparts.
170
  States should resist applying 
these provisions only to flagship universities or research-intensive 
institutions.  Community colleges, small universities, and other 
institutions with relatively small amounts of resources would 
benefit from these provisions as well. 
As a final matter, the first paragraph also provides model 
compliance language that institutions may incorporate into their 
contracts to ensure compliance with the previous sentences.  This 
provision is designed to reduce administrative and negotiating 
costs on the part of universities.  Where this language is 
incorporated, there is no doubt that the contract is in compliance 
with the statute‘s terms and that fair use rights are preserved for 
library users. 
 
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66700 (West 2011) (leaving the definition and establishment of 
community colleges to the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges). 
 169 See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 529; see also supra notes 83–87 and 
accompanying text (discussing why the assertion of fair use is important in allowing 
institutions of higher education to ―retain some autonomy over academic content and 
preserve some equity in the delivery of its mission.‖).  
 170 Another option is to simply apply the provisions to all arms of the state, regardless 
of educational purpose. One way of deciding which agencies to include under this 
broader-reaching directive might be to just adopt the test of which state agencies are 
covered by the 11th Amendment. Because they are exempt from damage awards, those 
agencies would pose a lower risk in terms of potential damages awards under the 
Copyright Act, which can be substantial. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
Furthermore, the test for 11th Amendment applicability is often phrased in terms that 
support this paper‘s proposal as a funding, rather than ideological, restriction on what the 
state should be paying for:  
Six factors determine whether an entity is an arm of the state: ―(1) 
how the entity is referred to in its documents of origin; (2) how the 
governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is 
funded; (4) whether the entity‘s function is traditionally one of local 
or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the 
entity‘s actions; and (6) whether the entity‘s financial obligations are 
binding upon the state.‖ 
Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting McGinty v. New York, 251 
F.3d 84, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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The second paragraph does most of the work.  Its provides that 
Any contract or license term, between any person or 
entity and a state supported college or university, as 
defined in [statutory definition], which alters, 
restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use rights and 
defenses granted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 shall be 
rendered void and against the public policy of 
[state]. The provisions of the previous sentence 
shall only apply to contracts entered into after the 
effective date of this Act. 
This paragraph does two things. First, it renders void any 
contract terms that restrict the scope of fair use.  It makes clear that 
even in the case of an institution that ignores the first paragraph, 
those contract terms are nonetheless void. Second, it applies the 
terms of this provision only to new contracts, avoiding problems 
with the Constitutional prohibition on impairments of contracts.
171
 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses 
The major benefit of this kind of legislation is that it allows 
academic libraries and their users to freely assert fair use without 
the burden of contractual restrictions that render the fair use 
analysis meaningless.  Unlike the model licenses, a uniform rule 
that applies to all state institution contracts will give users some 
degree of certainty that their efforts in making the fair use analysis 
are meaningful and valid. 
Likewise, this approach avoids the problems of wholesale 
modification of state contract law, which would constitute a 
sweeping change to the way businesses and consumers, as well as 
state institutions, contract for copyrighted goods.  To be sure, this 
is an area ripe for more study, in particular to examine the way 
such a sweeping change might be implemented for other classes of 
 
 171 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Though, in enacting this provision as a matter of 
public policy, the state may have some footing to assert retroactive application.  ―[T]he 
reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the state is read into all 
contracts . . . .‖ Home Bldg. & Loan Ass‘n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). This 
may be especially true of a state-law protection of fair use—a right that is unlikely to be 
heavily used even without contractual restrictions, and a right that is provided in federal 
law in part to protect First Amendment free speech rights. 
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users or for consumers as a whole, with due regard for issues of 
federalism, statutory preemption, and dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence.  While changes to state contract law as a whole may 
be desirable, those changes are undoubtedly more difficult than 
this paper‘s more modest proposal.  Contractual restrictions that 
apply only to state institutions represent an incremental step in the 
same direction, but are less jarring because they apply only to a 
specialized set of copyrighted content purchasers.  Further, for 
many institutions the change in licensing practices would be small.  
Many libraries already strive to preserve fair use with model 
license language,
172
 and this proposal simply makes those license 
terms non-negotiable.
173
 
Because this approach represents only an incremental change, 
it also has a legitimate chance of being implemented.  State 
legislatures have shown some interest in modifying their laws to 
meet the demands of electronic licensing issues, but wholesale 
changes to contract law are more difficult because of the 
widespread impact those changes would have.  States have 
regularly created self-imposed restrictions on government contract 
practices, many of them similar to this proposal.
174
 
As compared to changes to federal copyright law itself, this 
state-level approach is not necessarily preferable.  It does however, 
represent a more achievable level of change than other proposals 
made thus far.  At the federal level, Congress is unlikely to act. 
Generating and passing legislation at the federal level is an 
incredibly difficult process.
175
  Moreover, legislation that benefits 
copyright users or academic institutions is far outside the current 
 
 172 See, e.g., CLIR/DLF Model License, supra note 108; UNIV. OF CAL. COLLECTION 
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, Principles for Acquiring and Licensing Information in 
Digital Formats, UNIV. OF CAL. LIBR. (2006), http://libraries.universityof 
california.edu/cdc/principlesforacquiring.html.  
 173 In contrast to the non-negotiable adhesion contracts discussed above, that had the 
effect of severely restricting, if not eliminating fair use, this non-negotiable regulation or 
contract provision in state institution contracts would ensure full access to fair use rights, 
and would protect the arguably less sophisticated party in any negotiation over other 
terms.   
 174 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.  
 175 See generally The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). 
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realm of legislative proposals; instead, federal lobbying is tilted 
toward protection of existing content owners.
176
 
States legislatures may be more likely to act on this issue for 
two reasons.  First, the restriction is in the state‘s own best 
interest—it is, after all, their state budgets that underwrite public 
university access to these databases.  Public university funding can 
be heavily scrutinized, and state legislatures have a very real 
interest in seeing that their universities get the most for their 
money.  Congress, by comparison, has less of a direct financial 
interest in users‘ rights because it does not have to pay for this 
content.  Second, the lobbying dynamic at the state level may be 
more considerate of the interests of large state institutional 
stakeholders.  At the state level, public university lobbying can be 
relatively influential, given its size and economic impact on the 
particular states, as compared to at the federal level. These two 
reasons for adopting a state-level approach may, of course, vary 
significantly from state to state and from time to time, and it is 
difficult to state with certainty how these dynamics would play out 
in reality. The stagnation of solutions from the federal level, 
however, makes the state level approach one option worth 
pursuing. 
Ultimately, however, the strength of this proposal as a small, 
incremental, local change may also be its weakness.  For one, it 
may not do enough.  This proposal focuses on a narrow change in 
the law that applies only to state institutions.  Private institutions, 
however, experience many of the same licensing problems that 
public institutions experience.
177
  Private institutions would feel 
some spill-over effects because vendors would have to justify why 
they can concede fair-use protections in state licenses but not in 
private licenses, but the benefit is less direct.  Private institutions 
would also not experience the same level of uniformity among 
their licenses.  Because any gains in fair-use protections would still 
be negotiable with vendors, private users might still face 
uncertainty in determining the value of the fair use analysis with 
respect to work taken from any given database. 
 
 176 See LDA Reports, supra note 145. 
 177 See McDowell, supra note 63, at A1. 
HANSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  1:57 PM 
2011] USING STATE LAW TO PRESERVE FAIR USE 39 
The opposite side of this weakness is that public institutions 
may be at a competitive disadvantage when bargaining with 
vendors.  Because public institutions would now have to insist on 
contract terms that private institutions would not, public 
institutions may be forced to pay higher prices than their private 
counterparts.  This problem may be exacerbated if only one or a 
few states implement this papers‘ proposed change, leaving a small 
and discrete group of institutions against which rights holders may 
discriminate in pricing licensing contracts.  Although existing 
contractual restrictions on state institutions have not resulted in an 
appreciable price difference between public and private licenses, 
terms that preserve fair use rights may come at some cost to public 
institutions. 
On balance, the negative aspects of this limited proposal are 
outweighed by the fact that some change is needed, and alternative 
solutions are either unlikely to be implemented or are simply 
ineffective and unenforceable by themselves.  Further, the small 
changes suggested here should be thought of as a first step toward 
restoring balance between copyright owners‘ and users‘ rights.  
Applying these contract restrictions to private institutions, or to the 
public at large, may be a logical next step. 
III. OTHER AREAS FOR STATE LAW LICENSE RESTRICTIONS 
Restrictions on state contracting may be used to protect other 
important copyright-related rights in ways that are currently 
impossible under existing federal law.  One area that may be 
amenable to this type of change would be rules of contract 
construction in determining the distinction between a sale and a 
license.  The doctrine of first sale allows libraries to ―sell or 
otherwise dispose of‖ copies of works that they have legally 
purchased—that is, particular copies over which the library is the 
―owner,‖ not merely a licensee.178  This right justifies library 
lending and is vital to the distribution of single-copy digital media 
in physical formats (DVD or CD, usually).
179
  Recent federal cases 
 
 178 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).  
 179 Id.  
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have challenged the stability of the first-sale doctrine as applied to 
these formats,
180
 and carefully drafted state restrictions on the 
ability of vendors to easily substitute ―licensee‖ status over 
―owner‖ status for libraries (or users in general) may be beneficial. 
Another application may be to promote author-archiving in 
open-access repositories, as an alternate way that university, state-
funded authors can make their works available.  Universities in 
particular fund a large amount of creative content, but they pay for 
it twice—once in faculty salaries, and a second time through 
licensing contracts that purchase back access for many of the very 
same works that faculty have authored.
181
  Academic authors rarely 
receive direct compensation for their writing, and universities also 
see no direct revenue for those activities.
182
  Thus, the lifecycle of 
scholarly communication involves significant and repeated outlays 
by scholars and their universities, with little direct benefit for 
either the institution or, in the case of public institutions, the 
citizens of the state that supports the institution.  Requiring that 
state institutions maintain public or, at a minimum, institutional 
access to works which they have already funded through salaries 
would be one way to partially avoid these double payments. 
At the federal level, funding agencies, such as the National 
Institutes of Health
183
 and the National Science Foundation,
184
 
 
 180 See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
restrictions on sale of second-hand software were valid license terms not subject to first 
sale doctrine); Complaint, Ass‘n for Info. Media & Equip. et al v. Regents of The Univ. 
of Cal. et al., No. CV 10-9378 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010), available at 
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/cacdce/2:2010cv09378/489296/ (asserting that 
DVDs held by the UCLA are subject to licenses which prohibit reuse or copying for 
―time‖ and ―format‖ shifting purposes).  See generally Parzanowski & Schultz, supra 
note 1 (exploring in detail the problems courts have faced when applying the first sale 
doctrine to digitally distributed materials).  
 181 See generally Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 464. 
 182 Lloyd L. Weinred, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 
1233 (1998). 
 183 NAT‘L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH Public Access Policy Details, NAT‘L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH PUBLIC ACCESS (Apr. 30, 2011) http://publicaccess.nih.gov/policy.htm (―[A]ll 
investigators funded by the NIH submit or have submitted for them to the National 
Library of Medicine‘s PubMed Central an electronic version of their final, peer-reviewed 
manuscripts upon acceptance for publication, to be made publicly available no later than 
12 months after the official date of publication . . . .‖). 
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have seen success in conditioning funding on the requirement that 
authors make the published results of their research available in an 
open-access repository.
185
  ARL libraries have already suggested 
model language that conditions licenses between publishers and 
libraries on the condition that those same publishers grant 
institutionally-affiliated authors the right to archive their works in 
open-access repositories.
186
  Making those archiving rights for 
authors mandatory through contractual restrictions on public 
institutions would further that initiative.
187
 
CONCLUSION 
Contracts can do funny things to the balance of rights granted 
by Congress in the Copyright Act.  For public institutions that 
spend large amounts of money on copyrighted content, contractual 
restrictions on users‘ rights are especially problematic given the 
needs of academic library patrons.  In recent years, academic 
libraries have experienced a dramatic shift in the acquisitions 
practice—from purchasing physical copies of works to licensing 
access to those works.  With this shift toward licensing, academic 
library users‘ rights under federal copyright law have been 
diminished.  In particular, these restrictions have narrowed the 
scope of fair use, a right whose free exercise is important to 
academic freedom and equity across institutions of higher 
education.  These contractual limitations alter the delicate balance 
of author and user rights, and have garnered significant criticism 
 
 184 NSF Data Management Plan Requirements, NAT‘L SCI. FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nsf.gov/eng/general/dmp.jsp.  
 185 Support for these mandates has not been universal and legislation has been 
introduced to discontinue the practice. See Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R. 
801, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (―No Federal agency may, in connection with a funding 
agreement . . . impose or cause the imposition of any term or condition that . . . requires 
the transfer or license to or for a Federal agency . . . .‖). 
 186 Model Language, AUTHOR RIGHTS MODEL LICENSING LANGUAGE http://authorrights. 
wordpress.com/model-language (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). 
 187 Unlike the preservation of a federally created balance of rights, however, a 
mandatory license term which dictates author self-archiving rights would venture 
dangerously close to granting an ―equivalent right,‖ that may be preempted by federal 
copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127 
§ 1.01[B]. Thus, the boundaries of this application and the possibility of preemption 
should be further explored.  
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from scholars.  Thus far, proposals to restore the balance have not 
been effective because they are either too ambitious (as with 
federal preemption) or too weak (as with model licenses).  This 
paper proposes a solution that falls between those two extremes, 
and which may be useful to rebalance the rights of content owners 
and users with respect to other academic uses as well. 
Academic library users are not, however, the only group of 
users that are negatively impacted by licensing restrictions on 
rights like fair use.  As the digital distribution of copyrighted 
works becomes more common, consumers are presented with the 
same problems as those in academia.  Because contracts—
creatures of state law—are what enable these problems, state 
courts and legislatures should give serious thought to modifying 
state contract law, either for individual classes of users (as this 
paper proposes), or for consumers in general. 
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED TEXT FOR STATE CONTRACT LIMITS ON FAIR 
USE RESTRICTIONS 
 
EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE PRESERVATION ACT 
To amend the General Statues, to preserve educational fair use 
for state college and university library users. 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the 
―Educational Fair Use Preservation Act of 2011.‖ 
SECTION 2. FINDINGS. 
Whereas, [state] seeks to support the academic mission of its 
colleges and universities by providing access to educational and 
research materials to the greatest extent possible, 
Whereas, it is also the policy of the state of [state] to take 
advantage of the rights and defenses provided under the federal 
copyright laws, 
Whereas, state supported colleges and universities pay high 
and increasing fees associated with the provision of electronically 
distributed works, while at the same time ceding rights and 
defenses of federal copyright law through restrictive licensing 
terms, 
Whereas, those reductions in rights and defenses are impacting 
the core academic mission of state supported colleges and 
universities, 
Whereas, the most egregious of these reductions involves a 
contractual modifications to the scope of fair use, as provided for 
in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code, a right which 
is of central importance to academic writing and research, 
Therefore, 
SECTION 3. NO CONTRACTS RESTRICTING FAIR 
USE. 
―Sec 101. Restriction on College or University Contracts. 
―(a)—Restriction 
―No publicly supported college or university, as defined in 
[statutory definition], shall enter into any contract or license which 
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alters, restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use rights or defenses 
granted in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code. 
―(b)— Compliance Language 
―State supported colleges and universities may comply with 
this provision by incorporating the following language in contracts 
and licenses: 
―In accordance with the Educational Fair Use Preservation Act 
of 2011, nothing in this contract shall be construed to restrict 
[name of college or university] or its users from asserting the rights 
or defenses of fair use, as provided by Section 107 of Title 17 of 
the United States Code. 
SECTION 4. FAIR USE RESTRICTIONS VOID. 
―Sec. 201. Fair Use Restrictions Void 
―(a)— Restrictions Void 
―Any contract or license term, between any person or entity 
and a state supported college or university, as defined in [statutory 
definition], which alters, restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use 
rights and defenses granted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 shall be rendered 
void as against the public policy of the [state]. 
―(b)— Date of Application 
―The provisions of Subsection (a) shall only apply to contracts 
entered into after the effective date of this Act. 
 
